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To ‘Graze Freely in the Pastures of Philosophy’: 
The Pedagogical Methods and Political Motives  
of Socrates and the Sophists 
 
Coleen Zoller1 
 
‘Callias,’ I said, ‘if your sons were colts or calves, we could find and 
engage a supervisor for them who would make them excel in their proper 
qualities, some horse breeder or farmer.  Now since they are men, whom 
do you have in mind to supervise them?  Who has knowledge of that 
kind of excellence, the human and political kind?  I think you must have 
given thought to this since you have sons.  Is there such a person,’ I 
asked, ‘or is there not?’  --Socrates in Plato’s Apology 20a-b2 
 
I. Introduction 
Despite the fact that Plato’s Socrates denies being a teacher (Apology 19c-d, 33a-
b), some contemporaries of the historical Socrates thought of him as a teacher no 
different than a sophist.3 Meanwhile, even among those who read Socrates’ disavowal of 
teaching ironically some observe a great difference between Socrates and the sophists.4 
Yet, if sophists and philosophers could be distinguished simply by their appearances, 
then Callias’ doorman would have let Socrates and Hippocrates into the house 
immediately, knowing they were not sophists (Protagoras 314d-e).  But sophists cannot 
be identified by mere appearance, and as a result, as Socrates says to Hippocrates, ‘As to 
what exactly a sophist is, I would be surprised if you really knew’ (Protagoras 312c; 
emphasis added).5  
In the late 19th century Sidgwick claimed that the difference between a 
philosopher and a sophist lies in their differing methods of argument.6  Nehamas has 
already shown the shortcomings of describing the difference as a methodological one. 
However, while I agree with Nehamas’ argument that the proper contrast lies in the 
difference ‘between two purposes that argument can serve, one serious and the other 
                                                 
1 514 University Avenue, Susquehanna University, 024 Bogar Hall, Selinsgrove, PA 
17870 USA.  E-mail: zoller@susqu.edu 
2 Emended translation.  G.M.A. Grube’s translation in Plato Complete Works, ed. John M. 
Cooper (Indianapolis, 1997).  
3 See, e.g., Aristophanes in Clouds and Aeschines in Against Timarchus. For an 
interpretation of the Clouds in which Aristophanes is not intent on depicting Socrates as 
a typical sophist, see Paul Vander Waerdt, ‘Socrates in the Clouds’, in The Socratic 
Movement, ed. Vander Waerdt (Ithaca, 1994), pp. 48-86. 
4 For the most part this paper will speak of the sophists as depicted in Plato’s dialogues 
rather than the historical sophists in the same way that it mostly discusses Plato’s 
Socrates instead of the historical Socrates. 
5 Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell’s translation in Cooper, Complete Works.  
6 Henry Sidgwick, ‘The Sophists’, Journal of Philology, 4 (1872), pp. 288-307. 
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not,’7 I will argue that the difference between sophistry and philosophy extends to a 
difference between two methods of pedagogy as well.  
My central argument here is twofold.  I will show that Socrates and the sophists 
have differing political motives, and this difference in turn causes them to approach 
pedagogy differently.  In Section II I will show that Plato’s Sophist invites inquiry into 
not only the difference between philosophy and sophistry but also into the differences 
among the sophists.  Scholarly treatments of the sophists are good as far as they go,8 but 
they have not paid adequate attention to the distinction between the two strategies 
employed by sophists. In Section III I will examine the difference between two sophistic 
strategies, namely, engaging in sly flattery, like Gorgias9 and Protagoras, and being 
forthrightly frivolous like Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.10 I will also show how 
Socrates’ motive for conversing publicly differs from the motives underlying sophistic 
                                                 
7 Alexander Nehamas, ‘Eristic, Antilogic, Sophistic, Dialectic: Plato’s Demarcation of 
Philosophy from Sophistry’, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 7 (1990), p. 9. 
8 See, e.g., Nehamas, ‘Eristic’; W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. 3, Part 1, 
The Sophists. (Cambridge, 1971); Rosamond Kent Sprague, ed., The Older Sophists 
(Columbia, SC, 1972); G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, 1981); C.J. 
Rowe, ‘Plato on the Sophists as Teachers of Virtue’, History of Political Thought, 4 (1983), 
pp. 409-427; Jacqueline de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, translated by 
Janet Lloyd (Oxford, 1992); Gisela Striker, ‘Methods of Sophistry’, in Essays on Hellenistic 
Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge, 1996); Roslyn Weiss, ‘When Winning Is Everything: 
Socratic Elenchus and Euthydemian Eristic’, in Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides, ed. 
T.M. Robinson and Luc Brisson (Sankt Augustin, 2000); Sarah Broadie, ‘The Sophists and 
Socrates’, in The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy, ed. David Sedley 
(Cambridge, 2003); C.C.W. Taylor, ‘Socrates the Sophist’, in Remembering Socrates: 
Philosophical Essays, ed. Lindsay Judson and Vassilis Karasmanis (Oxford, 2006); and 
Paul Woodruff, ‘Socrates among the Sophists’, in A Companion to Socrates, ed. Sara 
Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar (Malden, MA, 2006). 
9 It should be noted that Gorgias does not describe himself as a sophist, and Callicles, 
who greatly admires Gorgias, despises sophists (Gorgias 520a). Neither does Meno, also 
a student of Gorgias, see Gorgias as a sophist. Meno offers the picture of Gorgias the 
orator (rather than a sophist) in response to Socrates’ description of sophists as those 
who profess to be teachers of virtue (Meno 95b).  He says, ‘he ridicules the others when 
he hears them making this claim.  He thinks one should make people clever speakers’ 
(Meno 95c). Readers of the Gorgias see Gorgias succumb to the pressure to claim that 
anyone who comes to him without knowledge of justice will ‘learn these things from 
[him]’ (Gorgias 460a).  As a result, Meno ought to consider Gorgias a sophist.  At any 
rate, here I will refer to Gorgias as a sophist, even though Callicles did not see that ‘they 
are one and the same, the sophist and the orator, or nearly so and pretty similar’ (Gorgias 
520a). Pace E.R. Dodds, Plato’s Gorgias (Oxford, 1959), p. 7, Striker argues that Plato takes 
the claim that Gorgias is an orator rather than a sophist as ‘merely a subterfuge, an 
attempt to find a more polite label for a sophist’ (‘Methods’, p. 6).  Also noting the 
likelihood of this are Rowe, ‘Plato’ and E.L. Harrison, ‘Was Gorgias a Sophist?’ Phoenix, 
18 (1964), pp. 183-192.  
10 Plato uses the terms ‘frivolity’ and ‘flattery’ at Euthydemus 278b-c and Gorgias 463bff., 
501c, 527c, respectively. 
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education in general.  Whereas the sophistic strategies are both directed at popularity 
and wealth, Socrates’ work is always directed at learning.  It is this divergence of 
motivation that leads to a difference in pedagogical method, which I will examine in 
Section IV.  There I will describe, following the agricultural hunger imagery Plato uses at 
Protagoras 320a, Republic 498b, and Phaedrus 248b-c, Socratic pedagogy as cowherding 
students toward grazing in the pastures of philosophy.  On the other hand, the pedagogy 
of the sophists is the conventional process of feeding lessons to students, which became 
the conventional method of pedagogy in the West.11  
I will offer this metaphor for Socratic pedagogy fully aware that Socrates 
explicitly employs another metaphor for his practice in the Theaetetus, that of the 
midwife.  There Plato has Socrates say to Theaetetus: 
For one thing which I have in common with the ordinary 
midwives is that I myself am barren of wisdom…So that I am not 
in any sense a wise man; I cannot claim as the child of my own 
soul any discovery worth the name of wisdom. But with those 
who associate with me it is different.  At first some of them give 
the impression of being ignorant and stupid; but as time goes on 
and our association continues, all whom God permits are seen to 
make progress—a progress with is amazing both to other people 
and to themselves.  And yet it is clear that this is not due to 
anything they have learned from me; it is that they discover 
within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they 
bring forth into the light.  But it is I, with God’s help, who deliver 
them of this offspring… There is another point also in which those 
who associate with me are like women in child-birth.  They suffer 
the pains of labor, and are filled day and night with distress; 
indeed they suffer far more than women.  And this pain my art is 
able to bring on, and also to allay… So I want you to come to me 
as to one who is both the son of a midwife and himself skilled in 
the art; and try to answer the questions I shall ask as well as you 
can (150a-151d). 
 
The midwife metaphor and the cowherd metaphor need not be construed as competing 
or mutually exclusive.  Rather, the conception of his pedagogy that Socrates attempts to 
convey with his midwife metaphor is reinforced by the cowherd metaphor.  
 
II. Education and Empeiriai in the Sophist 
One might consider sophists like Euthydemus and Dionysodorus12 so clownish 
that Plato would not take them seriously or bother to distinguish Socrates from them, 
                                                 
11 At Theaetetus 150a-151d we see a parallel contrast between midwifery and 
impregnation, which is noticed also by David L. Blank, ‘Socratics versus Sophists on 
Payment for Teaching’, Classical Antiquity, 4 (1985), p. 24. 
12 I follow Sprague, Older Sophists, p. 295 in treating Euthydemus and Dionysodorus 
without distinction despite my agreement with Mary Margaret McCabe, ‘Silencing the 
Sophists: The Drama of the Euthydemus’, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in 
Ancient Philosophy, 14 (1998), p. 163 that, although the brothers are portrayed at the 
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concentrating instead on distinguishing him from Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and 
Prodicus. I, on the other hand, believe that in Plato’s attempt to distinguish Socrates 
from the sophists he does also have in mind men such as Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus precisely because in the popular imagination Socrates may resemble them 
more closely than the flattering sophists. As Taylor says, Plato’s Socrates ‘is always 
fighting against the sophists because he is so close to them… Socrates is thus the 
paradigm intellectual whose activities are dismissed by the ignorant as mere useless 
chattering.’13  
Because Socrates refutes his interlocutors without proffering positive knowledge 
in the wake of an elenchus, Socrates’ elenctic practice might seem just like Euthydemus’ 
and Dionysodorus’ eristic behavior. In the Euthydemus Plato portrays a speechwriter 
who believes that the trivial conversation he heard from Euthydemus and Dionysodorus 
is representative of philosophical conversations. This ‘no-man’s-lander’ walks off 
thinking he knows what philosophy really is.  Crito explains that this man told him that 
he heard nothing but ‘chattering and making a worthless fuss about matters of no 
consequence’ and that, as a result, the man considers philosophy and those who practice 
it to be of ‘no value whatsoever!’ (Euthydemus 3043-305a).14  Owing to the mistaking of 
sophistry for philosophy, such a person considers himself well-informed about 
philosophy and believes it to be the activity of caring ‘nothing about what they say, but 
just [to] snatch at every word’ (Euthydemus 305a).   
Even people who directly converse with Socrates sometimes consider him to be 
the sort of person who delights in worthless discussions.  Think, for example, of when 
Hippias says of Socrates that he ‘always creates confusion in arguments, and seems to 
argue unfairly’ (Lesser Hippias 373b).15 Callicles too confuses Socrates with a frivolous 
sophist when he mistakes Socrates’ attention to craftsmen and their endeavors with the 
frivolous sophists’ conversations about trivial subjects.16  He says to Socrates, ‘You 
simply don’t let up on your continual talk of shoemakers and cleaners, cooks and 
doctors, as if our discussion were about them!’ (Gorgias 491a), and he follows this by 
remarking to Gorgias that Socrates ‘keeps questioning people on matters that are trivial, 
hardly worthwhile, and refutes them!’ (Gorgias 497b)17 As a result, Socrates does need to 
be differentiated from the sophists in general, which is the implicit project of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
beginning of the dialogue as clones of one another, there is a continuing separation 
between them as the discussion goes on. 
13 Taylor, ‘Socrates’, p. 157, p. 163. 
14 Rosamond Kent Sprague’s translation in Cooper, Complete Works. 
15 Nicholas D. Smith’s translation in Cooper, Complete Works. 
16 Of course Callicles also repeatedly accuses Socrates of being a ‘dêmêgoros,’ which 
indicates that Socrates could also be mistaken for what I call a slyly flattering sophist 
(Gorgias 482c-e, 494d).  In these passages, however, Callicles actually believes neither 
that Socrates is a flatterer nor that he is a sophist; instead, his motive in making the 
accusation is simply to discredit Socrates in order to make himself look better in the 
midst of being refuted by Socrates.   
17 Donald J. Zeyl’s translation in Cooper, Complete Works.  Perhaps Alcibiades’ most 
shining moment occurs when he reveals himself as someone who does not mistakenly 
assess Socrates’ arguments ‘about pack asses, or blacksmiths, or cobblers, or tanners’ as 
‘totally ridiculous’ (Symposium 221e-222a).  
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Euthydemus, Gorgias, and Protagoras.  However, the final division in Plato’s Sophist 
reminds us that there are also distinctions to be made among the sophists.18 
The final division of Plato’s Sophist sets two methods of sophistry apart from 
each other.  The Sophist ultimately distinguishes between the ‘demagogue,’ who ‘can 
maintain his insincerity in long speeches to a crowd,’ and the ‘sophist,’ who ‘uses short 
speeches in private conversation to force the person talking with him to contradict 
himself’ (Sophist 268b).19 This division reflects the distinction between flattering sophists 
and frivolous sophists, respectively.20  I will explore this distinction further in the next 
section, but now let’s examine how the Stranger arrives at this conclusion. 
 Reminiscent of Gorgias 464b-c, the Stranger leads Theaetetus through a division 
of the art of cleansing, dividing it into the cleansing of the body and of the soul (Sophist 
226e). The Gorgias passage explains its distinction between sophistry and oratory solely 
by analogy: what sophistry is to legislation, oratory is to justice.  Legislation precedes 
psychic offenses, while justice follows them. To take Irwin’s point further, we can also 
say that sophistry is the imitation of the true consideration of ‘how the nomoi, general 
moral and political norms, should be,’ while oratory ‘takes the nomoi for granted’ and is 
the imitation of true justice, which applies the nomoi.21  The Sophist is aligned with the 
account in the Gorgias by indicating that when the soul is neglected it needs the 
regulative component of the holistic treatment of the soul and when the soul is 
dysfunctional it needs to be corrected (otherwise it becomes wicked).  However, 
diverging from the Gorgias’ account, the Stranger does not call the regulatory care of the 
soul ‘legislation’ but rather teaching, which he divides into one sort that teaches the 
crafts and one that he calls education,22 which gets rid of lack of learning, that is, ‘not 
knowing, but thinking that you know’ (Sophist 229c-d). He further divides education 
into admonition and refutation (Sophist 229e-230b). 
This method of refutation is the Socratic elenchus, but shaming the soul through 
refutation in order to remove mere opinion is a delicate craft.  There is additional 
difficulty surrounding this method because a student may not be able to recognize the 
difference between a genuine elenchus, namely, one that aims to disabuse someone of 
false beliefs, and a mere imitation of such an elenchus. For example, with their eristic 
arguments the frivolous sophists imitate the method of refutation, perverting it into a 
means for cheap victory that does not aim to disabuse anyone of false beliefs.  While 
Socrates himself is at times mistaken for a lover of victory (e.g., Gorgias 515b), he is 
                                                 
18 In this regard I am interested in a project similar to Richard S. Bluck, Plato’s Sophist  
(Manchester, 1975).  However, I do not necessarily agree with him insofar as he 
concludes that all of the definitions are attempts to identify individual types of sophists.   
19 Nicholas P. White’s translation in Cooper, Complete Works. 
20 Sprague, ‘The Euthydemus Revisited’ in Plato, ed. Robinson and Brisson, p. 11 has also 
noticed that this division in the Sophist describes someone ‘of the Euthydemian kind’. 
21 Terence Irwin, Plato Gorgias (Oxford, 1979), p. 136.  
22 This reflects the Protagoras’ distinction between education that produces one particular 
skill (epi technêi) and education for the sake of learning itself (epi paideiai) (313b-c). 
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‘driven to win’ rather than ‘being driven to win for the sake of winning.’23  Socrates 
believes that refutation is the service one friend does for another.24 
The other method of education, admonition, teaches pupils to imitate or repeat 
behavior that has not been rebuked. Protagoras serves as a prime example of how 
flattering sophistry relies heavily on admonition.  His students are supposed to learn by 
memorizing and reciting poetry, for instance, and by being corrected when mistakes are 
made.  Failing to win the favor of a particular crowd is perhaps the most imposing 
reproach of all. These procedures have the effect of encouraging behavior that has been 
positively reinforced and curtailing the actions that have been dismissed by admonition.  
However, this results in the student substituting the judgment of teachers and non-
expert crowds for his/her own critical thinking.  Becoming a student of rhetoric 
transforms one of the faces in a non-expert crowd into someone who knows what faces 
in a non-expert crowd find plausible.  So, even after the rhetorical educational 
experience, the unknowing student remains vulnerable to being deceived by someone 
who knows more precisely because this sort of education does not encourage critical 
thinking. The vulnerability of uncritical thinkers is easily exploited, and the expert 
imitator is proud to offer deceit in the place of truth to those who are at a distance from 
knowledge.   
According to the Stranger, the exploitative instructor puts appearances (that is, 
inaccurate representations) rather than likenesses in front of students (Sophist 234d-e).25  
Do sophists offer their students appearances deliberately?  This question would surely 
be asked by any former students lucky enough to discover that their previous 
experiences were with inaccurate representations. The Stranger claims that the sophist is 
a belief-mimicker, namely, the one who lacks knowledge of how to create an accurate 
image (Sophist 267e).  But there are two kinds of belief-mimickers: the first sort is one 
who is ‘foolish and thinks he knows the things he only has beliefs about’ and ‘the other 
sort has been around a lot of discussions, and so by temperament he’s suspicious and 
                                                 
23 Weiss, ‘Winning”, p. 72, n. 7. 
24  If one loves wisdom itself, then one will want it to be as universal as possible.  As in 
the Lysis, Socrates introduces a broadened sense of friendship that includes the 
responsibility to educate friends. We see this in practice as Socrates asks his interlocutors 
to correct him if ever he is wrong; he refers to this as the kindness that should be offered 
to a friend (Gorgias 470c, 504c, 506c). Additional references to friendship in the Gorgias 
should be noted at 473a, 499c, 500b, 507e and 519e. Furthermore, he claims that our 
concern for the souls of our friends should extend beyond our willingness to refute each 
other in conversation, but it should pursue justice for them if their souls are ever in need 
of that treatment.  Socrates claims that our obligation to educate our friends requires us 
to bring anyone for whom we care to justice if they do wrong, since justice ‘gets rid of 
the worst thing there is’ (Gorgias 480d). 
25 An appearance differs from a likeness in that a likeness is a proportional, accurate 
representation of the imitated original while an appearance represents proportions that 
appear beautiful rather than accurate.  As Kenneth Dorter, Form and Good in Plato’s 
Eleatic Dialogues: The Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman (Berkeley, 1994), p. 135 
writes, the maker of an appearance ‘compensates for the distorting effect of the 
audience’s perspective...  Thus, in an important sense the semblance [appearance] is not 
the original.’  But it is more unlike the original than is a mere likeness. 
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fearful that he doesn’t know the things that he pretends in front of others to know’ 
(Sophist 268a).  The former is haploos (a simple imitator), since his deception is 
unintentional; presumably he would make accurate images if he knew how. On the 
other hand, the latter is eirônikos (an insincere imitator), since he pretends to be unaware 
of his own ignorance.   
This facade is diametrically opposed to Socratic irony because Socrates conceals 
what we suspect is greater knowledge than he alleges to possess, concealing it because 
what he secretly possesses may rise only to the level of true belief.26 And when he 
suspects his own ignorance about something he confesses it and then examines what is 
perplexing him.  But the insincere imitator suspects his own ignorance about something 
and avoids both the confession and the ensuing examination.  Feigning ignorance of 
one’s own lack of knowledge is not only an act of deceit toward others but also shirks 
one’s intellectual obligation, limiting one’s own potential for growth.   
Still in pursuit of the sophist, the Stranger separates the ironic/insincere imitator 
into two types, the demagogue and the sophist. Theaetetus draws the conclusion that 
the demagogue is the imitator of a statesman and that the sophist is the imitator of a 
wise man (Sophist 268c). The demagogue who uses long speeches typically engages the 
strategic method of flattering audiences, telling them the sorts of things they want to 
hear and find impressive.  Theaetetus’ contrast of a demagogue with a statesman is 
consistent with the notion that a flattering sophist prioritizes conventional political 
concerns, such as the desire for wealth and a good reputation, over concern for real 
politics, that is, the care of the soul.  Meanwhile, the insincere imitator who forces people 
into contradictions with short addresses in private conversations engages the strategic 
method of impressing spectators with a certain command of language.  This sophist 
imitating the wise person who knows how to use words correctly.  But unlike the 
philosopher, he does not apply this knowledge to the pursuit of living well.27 Instead, 
this sophist rests content with being forthrightly frivolous.  
                                                 
26 Dorter is concerned about what kind of mimicker Socrates is, and I agree with the 
following assessment.  He writes, ‘Throughout the dialogues, including the Theaetetus, 
Plato shows himself well aware of the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of giving 
exceptionless definitions of philosophical concepts, that is, perfectly accurate images in 
words.  Does this mean that when he has given us imperfect verbal models (as Socrates 
often admits to doing) he is producing semblances rather than images, and practicing 
sophistry rather than philosophy?  Unlike the sophists he does not deliberately distort 
his models in accordance with his audience’s point of view.  The distortion is 
involuntary and unavoidable’ (Form and Good, p. 137). Surely philosophers are not 
striving for mere likenesses, but perhaps likenesses are the best one can do when trying 
to articulate ideas about the Forms.  One reason that the philosopher would settle for 
this consolation prize is that these linguistic shortcomings are unfortunate requirements 
for conversing with others.  Furthermore, one may not be able to make one’s own soul 
Justice itself, for example, but one can certainly strive to make one’s soul an accurate 
image of Justice.  Settling for images may be a requirement for thinking about, 
discussing, and instantiating the Forms.  The goal becomes then to create the most 
accurate images possible regardless of how pleasant and popular they may be. 
27 Cf. Euthydemus 277e-278d. 
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One may wonder why Plato has the Stranger apply the term ‘sophist’ only to the 
subdivision of ironic/insincere imitation that uses short addresses.  Isn’t the demagogue 
also a sophist?  It seems odd that the Stranger does not in general call ironic/insincere 
imitation ‘sophistry’ and then proceed to divide that concept into demagoguery and 
some other term.  Let us recall Gorgias 464b-465d, which is similar to the final division in 
the Sophist insofar as at Gorgias 465c the term ‘sophist’ is neither used as the general term 
to describe the sort of flattery that imitates politics nor is it applied to both of the two 
subdivisions of this general sort of flattery.  As in the Sophist, Plato chooses to apply the 
term ‘sophist’ to only one of the two subdivisions of the general concept. In the Gorgias 
politics is depicted as one craft with two branches (legislation and justice), and as such it 
is imitated by one entity (flattery) that likewise has two subdivisions (sophistry and 
oratory). If it is correct to see flattery in the Gorgias as parallel or identical to 
ironic/insincere imitation in the Sophist, then one expects for sophistry to be used the 
same way in both passages, which would lead the reader to see oratory and 
demagoguery as interchangeable.  
Plato has Socrates hint at this when he says, ‘because they are so close, sophists 
and orators tend to be mixed together as people who work in the same area and concern 
themselves with the same things’ (Gorgias 465c).  Identifying the long speeches of the 
demagogue with oratory both makes sense and is an attractive interpretation because it 
has Plato being consistent in his use of the term ‘sophist’ in the Gorgias and Sophist.  
What is centrally important about these two passages is that in both, even though Plato 
has the general concept of sophistry in mind, he attempts to draw attention to the subtle 
difference between two types of sophistic strategy. Given that sophistry is an image of 
philosophy, without perceiving the distinction between frivolous and flattering sophistic 
methods, we lose sight of the two distinct ways sophistry imitates philosophy. 
 
III. Motives in the Polis 
The forthrightly frivolous sophistry exemplified by the brothers Euthydemus 
and Dionysodorus is the impenitent life of verbal contests engaged in merely for the 
sake of victory and the fame and wealth that follow from victory. The sly flatterers are at 
heart just as victory-loving as the forthrightly frivolous sophists, but they attempt to 
hide their love of victory behind a veil of concern for ideas such as citizenship, justice, 
and virtue. Even though the brothers claim in the Euthydemus to be able to teach virtue 
(273d), these sophists exhibit no interest whatsoever in discussing virtue. The 
demonstration they give makes clear that they are not serious and their real interest is 
asserting their cleverness not by testing ideas but by ‘refuting whatever may be said, no 
matter whether it is true or false’ (Euthydemus 272a-b; emphasis added). Meanwhile the 
slyly flattering sophistry exemplified by Protagoras and Gorgias is marked by being 
persuasive about agreeable ideas rather than refuting them.  Thus, even though all 
sophists engage in public rhetoric because they are motivated by the quest for victory, 
fame, and wealth, they use different strategies to pursue this aim.  
 
A. Frivolity and Forthrightness in Euthydemus 
The Euthydemus introduces Plato’s readers to the archetypal verbal warrior 
whose eristic “form of fighting” does not search for truth but instead pursues only 
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victory.28  Before Clinias first replies to the brothers’ questioning, Socrates says, ‘Just at 
this moment Dionysodorus leaned a little toward me and, smiling all over his face, 
whispered in my ear and said, I may tell you beforehand, Socrates, that whichever way 
the boy answers he will be refuted’ (Euthydemus 275e).  Such is the character of eristic 
argument; its business is refuting whichever side of an argument is maintained by one’s 
opponent (Euthydemus 275d-276c, 276d-277c). Attempting to explain this method to 
Clinias who is unfamiliar with it, Socrates describes their method as ‘the correct use of 
words’ which is ‘the first part of the sophistic mysteries’ (Euthydemus 277e).29  
Socrates is critical of eristic talent because it fails to require anything more 
substantial than just the clever use of words.  As a result, Socrates claims to expect that 
the brothers will proceed to substantial subject matter; Socrates tells Clinias at the start 
that the brothers’ wisdom ‘has to do with important matters and not mere trivia’ 
(Euthydemus 273c).  However, the brothers have no intention of discussing any of the 
things Socrates considers important. Finally, Socrates voices his disapproval of this sort 
of whimsy when he says:  
I call these things ‘frivolity’ because even if a man were to learn 
many or even all such things, he would be none the wiser as to 
how matters stand but would only be able to make distinctions in 
words, just like the people who pull the chair out from under a 
man who is going to sit down and then laugh gleefully when they 
see him sprawling on his back.  So you must think of their 
performance as having been mere play (Euthydemus 278b-c).   
 
Although Socrates advocates Prodicus’ call for knowledge of the correct use of words 
(Euthydemus 277e), Socrates cautions Clinias that mastery of words alone is not what 
philosophy is.  Thus, he urges the brothers to show Clinias ‘serious things’ (ta spoudaia) 
(Euthydemus 278c). 
The frivolous sophist has a knack for appearing to use words well.  In this way 
the sophist imitates the logical precision to which philosophers aspire. But, unlike 
genuine philosophers, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus do not possess any significant 
respect for logos, for words or ideas. The brothers detest Socrates’ continued attempts to 
clarify his answers to their questions, and they chastise Socrates whenever he attempts 
to qualify his responses (Euthydemus 295b, 295e, 296a, 296b, 298a).  Socrates is dedicated 
                                                 
28 Imagine someone like Zeno being compared to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.  Zeno 
comes off more like a professor pointing out philosophical paradoxes (e.g., the apparent 
tension between causal determinism and free will, the apparent tension between a 
standard theistic notion of God and the existence of evil, etc.).  These paradoxes, which 
are more-or-less impossible to resolve, are not presented to students in order to make 
the professor’s ability to argue seem superior to that of the student.  Instead, they are 
presented to open students’ minds to philosophically problematic ideas.  So it is with 
Zeno, but Euthydemus and Dionysodorus’ presentations are not in this spirit.  Instead, 
they are designed simply to highlight their prowess at winning arguments. 
29 This phrase leads the reader to anticipate an account of the sophistic mysteries’ second 
part. However, readers are never explicitly presented with an explanation of what 
Plato’s Socrates has in mind here.  Nevertheless, I suspect that the ‘second part’ is the 
slyly flattering aspect of sophistry.  
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to the clarity of the argument and the precise attention to language from which clarity 
follows; his purpose in providing precise answers is to avoid words and negations that 
‘may trip [them] up’ (Euthydemus 296a).  By contrast, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus 
choose to ignore Socrates’ careful qualifications in favor of fallacious arguing.  
One might suggest that Euthydemus’ and Dionysodorus’ preposterous 
arguments are intended to test their listeners’ ability to see through their verbal traps.  
Socrates indeed passes these tests.   But it is unlikely that the brothers are using eristic as 
a way to explore language. For if they were using it as such, then they would not fear 
following the argument in any direction, even one that opposes what they have 
previously said.  Yet, such a fear is apparent when Euthydemus says to Dionysodorus, 
‘You are ruining the argument...and this fellow here will turn out to be not knowing, 
and then he will be knowing and not knowing at the same time’ (Euthydemus 297a).  He 
makes this remark because he anticipates how this contradiction will defy their claim 
that there are no contradictions (Euthydemus 284d-286b).30  This statement proves 
decisively that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are interested only in manipulating 
words to secure victories in verbal contests.  So, their attitude towards arguments 
diverges from Socrates’. As Weiss writes, ‘Socrates may be in the game of refutation and 
he may at times play just as dirty as sophists, but he will do so in the interest of refuting 
false views, that is, views that he regards as false—not in the interest of refuting any 
view, whether false or true.’31   
Socrates possesses an enormous respect for words, ideas, and other serious 
things.  He wants Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to show Clinias these ‘serious things,’ 
ta spoudaia, but the content of their conversations is cold, empty, what Ctesippus calls 
‘frigid’ (Euthydemus 284e).  Observing their comfort with being perceived as frigid, 
Socrates claims to appreciate that the brothers are not slaves to public opinion.  He says: 
Among the many fine things which belong to your arguments, 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, there is one which is the most 
magnificent of all, that you care nothing for the many, or in fact, for 
men of consequence or reputation, but only for persons of your own 
sort.  And I am convinced that there are very few men like you 
who would appreciate these arguments, but that the majority 
understand them so little that I feel sure they would be more 
ashamed to refute others with arguments of this sort than to be 
refuted by them (Euthydemus 303c-d; emphasis added). 
 
There is something admirable in not being intimidated by the judgments of others as 
well as in being forthright. This may be the only truly admirable quality found in 
frivolous sophistry.  Furthermore, Plato may try to warn the reader not to expect the 
                                                 
30 In addition to their claim that contradictions do not exist, they also argue that 
falsehood is impossible (Euthydemus 283e-284c). One might interpret this to mean that 
they are relativists in the same manner as Protagoras, since if there is no falsehood, then 
every statement is true (see, e.g., Kerferd, Sophistic Movement, p. 72).  However, as the 
claim that falsehood is impossible is simply part of their eristic gaming, it is not logically 
substantiated. Furthermore, for an argument that the sophists are not relativists, see 
Richard Bett, ‘The Sophists and Relativism’, Phronesis, 34 (1989), pp. 139-169. 
31 Weiss, ‘Winning’, pp. 70-1. 
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brothers to discuss serious matters, by distinguishing them at the dialogue’s outset from 
the sophist who takes up important issues.  This distinction might be made symbolically 
when Socrates informs Crito that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were exiled from 
Thurii (Euthydemus 271c), a colony whose laws were written by Protagoras, the primary 
exemplar of the sort of sophistry that flatters audiences with discussion of ta spoudaia.  
 
B. ‘Serious Things’: Slyness and Flattery in the Gorgias and Protagoras 
In the Gorgias Socrates wonders if one ought to live the way the sophists 
encourage, that is, ‘to engage in these manly activities, to make speeches among the 
people, to practice oratory, and to be active in the sort of politics you people engage in 
these days’ or if one should live ‘the life spent in philosophy’ (Gorgias 500c-d). He says 
that this question is the most serious one of all, and to answer it they must figure out 
how the two lifestyles differ from each other.32  These lives are traditional opponents in 
Greek tragedy, most notably, in Euripides’ Antiope, to which Callicles refers.  Euripides 
depicts brothers who represent two different ways of life: Zethus promotes the hands-on 
business of politics (as politics is usually construed), while Amphion lives the life of 
study and reflection. In the words of Snell, ‘One of them adheres to the vita activa, the 
other to the vita contemplativa.’33  Yet, as Nightingale notes, ‘Plato’s characters are more 
complex.  On the one hand, Callicles (unlike his prototype Zethus) is no enemy to 
intellectual pursuits…  Socrates, on his part, also diverges from his tragic predecessor.  
Whereas Amphion had totally removed himself from civic affairs, Socrates is a quite 
different animal.’34   
Socrates involves himself in the public life of Athens by spending his days 
talking with others in the agora. He is political and calls for us to understand politics in a 
more wide-ranging fashion than is customary.  Just as Callicles is not a mere double of 
Zethus, neither does oratory turn out to be identical to politics, contrary to Callicles’ 
view.  Meanwhile, just as Socrates is not Amphion’s asocial doppelganger, neither does 
philosophy turn out to be the reclusive, apolitical endeavor that Callicles, the 
Euthydemus’ speechwriter, and countless others take it to be. For Socrates, politics is 
more wide-ranging than the life exemplified by professional politicos like Zethus and 
Callicles because, even though hardly anyone attempts the true political craft, anyone 
can.35  Socrates also contends that the sort of politics envisioned by Gorgias, Polus, and 
Callicles is in fact not really politics at all.   
What these people call politics Socrates calls flattering oratory (têi kolakikêi), 
which stands in contrast with true oratory (têi alêthinêi rhtorikêi) (Gorgias 517a). Gorgias’ 
pride in oratory’s ability to deceive non-experts confirms Socrates’ contention that 
oratory is kolakeia (a kind of flattery), which Dodds explains as follows. 
Kolakeian is conventionally translated ‘flattery’, but the Greek term 
applies to a wider range of actions and also carries a more 
emphatic implication of moral baseness... The kolax is what the 
                                                 
32 Cf. Alcibiades 118b-c. 
33 Bruno Snell, Scenes from Greek Drama (Berkeley, 1964), p. 70. 
34 Andrea Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy 
(Cambridge, 1995), p. 70.  
35 See, e.g., Socrates’ broad understanding of politics compared with Phaedrus’ narrow 
understanding at Phaedrus 261a-b.   
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eighteenth century called a toad-eater or lickspittle and 
schoolboys called a bumsucker.  Kolakeia is the antithesis of the 
forthright integrity of word and act practised by Socrates...  In its 
political application... kolakeia stands for the time-serving 
opportunism which panders to public taste instead of trying to 
educate it.36  
 
Flattering orators promote whatever is popular without concern for what 
deserves to be promoted and what deserves to be exposed.  As Socrates accuses 
Callicles, ‘If you say anything in the Assembly and the Athenian demos denies it, you 
shift your ground and say what it wants to hear’ (Gorgias 481d). In the law courts the 
speakers argue on opposite sides about justice, but justice is not one thing and at the 
same time its opposite; so, they cannot all have knowledge of justice.37  In this we see 
that, unlike true oratory, which engages with something unchanging (that is, justice) and 
applies it to thinking about our changing world, rhêtorikê is occupied by the ever-
changing trends in what is popular. 
This flattery contrasts with the other sophistic strategy, frivolity, because, while 
sophists like Gorgias and Protagoras are concerned with saying popular things, frivolous 
sophists are only interesting in being popular as a result of winning their rhetorical 
contests.  All sophists pursue fame in order to attract students and make money, but 
they are distinguished by two different strategies for accomplishing their aim.  The 
flatterers choose a direct path of flattering crowds by appearing to be concerned with 
civic affairs and saying things that are easy to agree with.38 They believe that, if they 
were to win verbal battles by resorting to outrageous arguments, they would sound 
frivolous and become unpopular with audiences.  Accordingly, the flattering sophists 
choose to be sly, while the frivolous sophists are forthright about their hope that 
appearing clever will win them fame, even though most people do not aspire to talk in 
the outrageous way that frivolous sophists do. 
Examples abound of Gorgias trying to flatter his audiences.  When Socrates 
invites Gorgias, who has offered poor definitions of oratory, to continue their discussion 
Gorgias says that he is willing but he does not want to inconvenience the members of 
their audience who may be tired (Gorgias 458b-c).  Here he tries to preserve his own 
reputation by avoiding further refutation (there have been four to that point in the 
dialogue) but masks that motivation behind convenient concern for the audience’s 
comfort.  He hopes that in so doing they will believe that he is indeed the same sort of 
person that Socrates claims to be, namely, one who does not mind being refuted in the 
process of making a given subject clearer (Gorgias 457e-458c). The impulse to say what 
will be popular is also what leads Gorgias eventually to claim that he would indeed 
teach justice to any students without prior knowledge of it (Gorgias 460a). Gorgias 
chooses to be dishonest about his ability to teach justice in order to pander to the 
conventions of society. As Polus and Callicles point out, Gorgias only makes this claim 
                                                 
36 Dodds, Gorgias, p. 225. 
37 Cf. Phaedrus 261d. 
38 Scott R. Hemmenway, ‘Sophistry Exposed: Socrates on the Unity of Virtue in the 
Protagoras’, Ancient Philosophy, 16 (1996), p. 6 also suspects of Protagoras that he prefers 
sounding ‘respectable’ to being ‘more precise about his true offerings’. 
 13
because he knows that it would be unpopular with the crowd if he were to admit that he 
cannot teach justice because he does not himself know what it really is (Gorgias 461b-c; 
482c-d). As Callicles points out at 482c-e, Polus eventually repeats the very mistake he 
recognized Gorgias making, namely, assenting to a claim he does not actually believe is 
true in order to please the crowd.  
The desire exhibited by Polus and Gorgias to win popularity also appears in the 
Protagoras.  Concerning whether or not virtue can be taught, Protagoras’ initial position 
holds that virtue can be taught, which is predictable given that he is one who makes a 
living claiming to teach the art of citizenship (Protagoras 319a).  Thus, in front of a crowd 
of men in pursuit of virtue and teachers who can impart it, Protagoras begins with a 
claim that he imagines will be popular with the audience.  He claims that older sophists 
tried to conceal sophistry behinds masks, such as poetry, for fear of being hated and that 
he believes that they never really succeeded at hiding ‘from the powerful men in the 
cities the true purpose of their disguises’ (Protagoras 316d-a).  Here he flatters his 
listeners by claiming that the people of the cities are too smart to fall for the tricks of the 
older sophists.  He then proceeds to admit that he is indeed a sophist; from this move he 
gains the audience’s respect by appearing to be honest and courageous.39  Yet, the 
sneakiness of this is betrayed when he says that he had ‘given thought to other 
precautions as well, so as to avoid, God willing, suffering any ill from admitting [he is] a 
sophist’ (Protagoras 317b-c).  He does not say what these other precautions are, but the 
reader eventually deciphers that his real defense against being hated is pretending to 
care for virtue more than money and fame.  
Naturally Socrates sees through this pretense, but he worries that Hippocrates 
and other prospective students of sophists like Protagoras will not. Knowing where to 
direct one’s attention is a problem for the learner, and the intention to direct one’s 
concentration to the wiser teacher will likely lead the student to choose the one who 
makes a living merely seeming to be wise.  Protagoras goes to great lengths to seem wise.  
For example, in the face of Socrates’ request to ‘take the ‘if’ out’ and put their ideas ‘on 
the line’ (Protagoras 331c), Protagoras has no motivation to put himself and the argument 
to the test. Instead, his interest is in keeping the admiration of the audience by not 
putting himself through any test he might fail.  
Protagoras sees Socrates merely as a rhetorical opponent, and he treats their 
conversation as a contest that offers him a chance to preserve and extend his reputation.  
Protagoras admits to Socrates that not being able to carry on the discussion as he would 
conduct an argument in a verbal contest makes him uncomfortable because it could cost 
him his reputation and fame.  He says, ‘I have had verbal contests with many people, 
and if I were to accede to your request and do as my opponent demanded, I would not 
be thought superior to anyone, nor would Protagoras be a name to be reckoned with 
among the Greeks’ (Protagoras 335a).  This desire for ‘a name to be reckoned with’ 
eventually causes Protagoras to resort to the same behavior that he has criticized, 
namely, masking sophistry as something else (in this case, the interpretation of poetry) 
in order to shift the heat away from himself and onto Socrates’ ability to analyze poetry 
(Protagoras 339a).  
                                                 
39 For an account of Protagoras’ apparent courage as in reality ‘prudent caution or 
cautious prudence,’ see Hemmenway, ‘Sophistry Exposed’, pp. 4-5. 
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Of course this effort is unsuccessful as Socrates handles the poem in question and 
shifts the heat back to Protagoras, saying that the best people avoid discussing poetry 
because it leads to an argument ‘about something they can never finally decide’ 
(Protagoras 347e).  Thus, Socrates denounces Protagoras’ attempt to derail the 
conversation that was revealing Protagoras’ lack of interest in having the sorts of 
conversations about virtue that Socrates enjoys. On the whole, Protagoras’ attitude 
toward dialectic reveals what makes slyly flattering sophists especially untrustworthy.  
Despite the fact that the Protagoras ends in an aporia concerning what virtue is, in 
his conversation with Protagoras Socrates demonstrates his genuine commitment to 
figuring out what virtue is and whether virtue can be taught. There are three main 
examples in the Protagoras of Socrates being motivated by his commitment to inquiry 
rather than by a desire to say popular things.40  First, when the discussion is on the verge 
of collapse Socrates suggests that he is willing to yield his preferred role as questioner to 
Protagoras, if it will enable them to continue the discussion. Protagoras, on the other 
hand, ‘wanted no part of it’ but agreed to be the questioner because he realized how 
much that would be appreciated by the crowd (Protagoras 338d-e). Additionally, the role 
of questioner is turned back over to Socrates when Protagoras is shamed by Alcibiades 
into continuing with the discussion at 348c.  Secondly, at the end of the discussion when 
Socrates realizes that they have been discussing virtue without knowing what it actually 
is, he suggests that they ‘continue until [they] come through to what virtue is in itself,’ 
which Protagoras declines (Protagoras 361d).  If Protagoras’ defense of teaching virtue is 
not motivated by his interest in defending the possibility of his own profession, then he 
should be as enthusiastic as Socrates is about overcoming the aporia.  Finally, Socrates’ 
genuine concern for discovering truth is demonstrated by his willingness to modify his 
position on the question of whether virtue can be taught without feeling that he will lose 
ground in the argument (Protagoras 360e-361d).  
Unlike Socrates, the flattering sophist hides behind a veil of commitment to 
popular ideas because inquiry into truth is often difficult and unpopular.  What most 
people want from sophists is a way to make their lives easier.  Think, for example, of 
Strepsiades in Aristophanes’ Clouds who, looking to argue his way out of large debts, 
enters the Pondertorium because ‘for a small fee, these gentlemen … will teach you how 
to successfully argue any case, right or wrong’.41  Philosophy is not typically useful for 
such purposes as Strepsiades’. In fact, the philosophical activity tends to make life more 
challenging (rather than less) insofar as it brings us face to face with questions that are 
either difficult to answer or perhaps unanswerable, and among the scarce answers are 
some unexpected truths.  
Philosophers value the philosophical activity because of its ability to bring 
philosophers toward truth, which is the object of the philosopher’s desire (rather than 
fame or wealth). The philosopher considers thinking through all of this challenging and 
beneficial, but not everyone will see it that way.  So, faced with maintaining one’s 
reputation and wealth, the flattering sophist who is asked to make life better or easier is 
                                                 
40 For passages related to the importance to philosophers (including Socrates) of inquiry, 
knowledge, and truth rather than popularity, fame, or wealth, see Apology 17b-c, 18a, 
22d-23a; Gorgias 505e; Republic 354a-c, 475e, 485d, 501c-d, 537d, 581d-e; Phaedo 65a-e, 91a-
c; Phaedrus 230a; Protagoras 338d-e, 360e-361d; and Theaetetus 173c-174b. 
41 Aristophanes, Clouds, trans. Peter Meineck (Indianapolis, 2000), p. 9. 
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tempted to feed pleasant appearances to his pupils and audiences.  For example, 
consider when Protagoras pursues the admiration of the audience by telling them that 
he intends to offer them a story rather than an argument because he thinks it will be 
‘more pleasant’ (Protagoras 320c).42  There will always be a tension between working to 
make truth present to a student’s soul, which may be unpopular and difficult, and the 
flattering sophists’ self-interest, which leads them to desire to attract more students by 
being popular speakers, whose words are interesting and easy to follow. A student’s 
soul is endangered when entrusted to a sophist who ignores what is truly good in favor 
of pleasant appearances. 
All things considered there are strengths and weaknesses associated with both 
sophistic strategies. One can see the frivolous sophists’ avoidance of discussing serious 
ideas as a flaw because it indicates that they lack interest in the subjects that Socrates 
presents as centrally important.  So, one can prefer the orientation of sly flatterers to the 
empty frivolity of forthright sophists.  However, although the flattering sophists claim to 
be concerned with justice, virtue, citizenship, and the like, they are portrayed by the 
dialogues as failing to have any genuine interest in inquiring earnestly into such matters. 
Their main interest is not ‘to take a good hard look at things that continually perplex’ 
them (Protagoras 348c); rather, their interest is self-interest, just as it is for the frivolous 
sophists.   
As a result, the central distinction between these two sophistic strategies is that 
flattering sophists have a more devious strategy for being popular than forthrightly 
frivolous sophists do.  Conversely what unifies the sophists is being practitioners of a 
knack (empeiria), as defined at Gorgias 463a-465a. The products of an empeiria imitate 
what is crafted, and the practitioners of an empeiria aim merely at gratifying the 
consumer (for the sake of serving their own interests) rather than at producing 
something truly excellent.43  Their merchandise is made to look as much like first-rate 
products as possible without putting forth the effort to create something truly well-
crafted. Sophists consider empeiria sufficient and appropriate for interacting with their 
                                                 
42 Gorgias 505c-d and 523a also point to the tension between arguments and stories.  
Nevertheless, Socrates also tells stories himself at the end of the Gorgias, Phaedo, and 
Republic as well as at other points as well (for example, in the Gorgias he tells the myth of 
the waterbearers and in the Symposium he tells the story of what he learned from 
Diotima).  Does Socrates tell these stories because he is anxious to be popular and 
believes that telling stories rather than using arguments will make him popular?  I 
believe that the answer to this central question is a resounding ‘no’. In contrast with the 
way he has Socrates use analogies in order to make ideas clearer to interlocutors, the 
stories he has Socrates tell are not intended to make the ideas in question seem pleasant 
and/or easy to understand.  Instead, it seems that Plato uses myths to make the ideas in 
question harder to understand rather than easier.  I suspect that the myths are intended 
to challenge the interlocutor to see beyond the tale being considered. Since Plato’s use of 
myth is not the object of my investigation, I’ll leave full exploration of this hypothesis for 
another time. 
43 See Republic 341c-342e; 345c-d. 
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followers because they are more committed to sustaining their livelihood than they are 
to their students.44   
 
IV. The Pedagogical Methods of Socrates and the Sophists 
A. Teaching Virtue: Cowherding versus Feeding 
Revealing his own idea of education as the care of the soul, Socrates claims that 
‘everything concerning whether you do well or ill in your life depends on whether [the 
soul] becomes worthy (chrêstou) or worthless’ (Protagoras 313b).  If Socrates is correct, 
then what one chooses to learn is of the highest importance. Yet, what students learn is 
profoundly affected by how they learn, by the pedagogical methods of their teacher(s).  
While it is problematic for students to recognize teachers with the wrong motives, 
students do have access to the information that can be gleaned from a prospective 
teacher’s choice of pedagogical method.  
Traditionally the term ‘teacher’ has been applied only to those who employ the 
conventional pedagogical method that consists in a student mastering the knowledge 
explicitly offered by a teacher. I refer to this conventional pedagogy as the feeding 
method.  Socrates explicitly rejects the conventional feeding method when he says, 
‘Education isn’t what some people declare it to be, namely, putting knowledge into 
souls that lack it, like putting sight into blind eyes’ (Republic 518b-c). In terms of this 
conventional understanding of pedagogy, Socrates’ disavowal of teaching is 
straightforward because he never attempts to transfer knowledge directly to pupils. 
Nevertheless, Socrates is involved in a public educational project.  
In what is perhaps Socrates’ most genuinely insightful self-characterization, he 
says: ‘I believe that I’m one of a few Athenians--so as not to say I’m the only one, but the 
only one among our contemporaries--to take up the true political craft and practice true 
politics.  This is because the speeches I make on each occasion do not aim at gratification 
but at what’s best.  They don’t aim at what’s most pleasant’ (Gorgias 521d).45  By 
declaring his intention to attempt true political craftsmanship, Socrates announces both 
his quest to improve himself and others as well as his endeavor to be someone who 
knows how to aim at what is best and who could give an account of the process by 
which one comes to be improved.  In other words, in this passage Socrates has in effect 
proclaimed his aspiration to be a moral teacher. This claim stands in tension with his 
                                                 
44 Despite her otherwise quite positive review of sophistry, which includes her claim that 
Athenians were inclined to have conversations with Socrates only because of the 
intellectual sophistication that sophists brought to Athens, Broadie, ‘Sophists and 
Socrates’, pp. 90-1 speculates that the angry reactions that refuted interlocutors exhibit 
are probably caused by ‘the pattern of the sophists [which] had led many to assume that 
the point of engaging in systematic discourse was to demonstrate one’s superior 
expertise on the topics in question’.  In this regard, sophistry’s wealth- and victory-
loving character negatively affects interlocutors who might otherwise have come to 
believe that to refute someone is the act of a friend.  Someone who believes this does not 
fear refutation and, as a result, is capable of being liberated from ignorance by a Socratic 
elenchus. However, the sophistic movement has trained the people with whom Socrates 
converses to become embarrassed rather than being excited at the prospect of being 
disabused of false beliefs, and therefore, their capacity for learning is impaired. 
45 Cf. Alcibiades 119b. 
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famous denial of being a teacher (Apology 19c-d, 33a-b).  While Socrates’ pedagogical 
method is on display in every interaction he has with interlocutors, it is symbolized in 
an interesting way by agricultural hunger imagery that he introduces in the Protagoras.  
The cowherd metaphor calls for attention precisely because it reinforces the point made 
by the midwife metaphor in the Theaetetus about Socrates’ pedagogical approach. 
Socrates worries that perhaps virtue cannot be taught by anyone.  His concern 
about virtue’s teachability appears to stem from his acquaintance with ‘men who are 
good themselves but have never succeeded in making anyone else better, whether 
family members or total strangers’ (Protagoras 320b).  If knowledge of virtue could be 
transmitted from one person to another, then virtuous people would certainly teach 
moral knowledge to their children and friends.  Yet, it is clear that moral education does 
not work this way.  On more than one occasion Socrates singles out Pericles as an 
example of a virtuous person who is supposed to be a ‘caretaker of men’ (Gorgias 516c) 
but nevertheless fails to step into the role of moral teacher. In two passages Socrates uses 
agricultural imagery as a tool to communicate his disappointment in Pericles for letting 
both his sons and his citizens stray.  First, Socrates says: 
Look at Pericles, the father of these young men here.  He gave 
them a superb education in everything that teachers can teach, but 
as for what he himself is really wise in [virtue], he neither teaches 
them that himself nor has anyone else teach them either,46 and his 
sons have to graze like stray sacred cattle and meet with virtue on 
their own wherever they happen upon it (Protagoras 320a; 
emphasis added).47 
 
In likening Pericles’ sons to cattle in need of food,48 Socrates makes hunger the 
symbol of ignorance and eating the symbol of learning; and teaching, as a result, 
involves a choice between feeding the hungry or putting them out to graze.  Moreover, 
there are two ways of putting the hungry out to graze, namely, either completely on 
their own, which Socrates critically accuses Pericles of having done, or with a cowherd 
to tend them.49 The careful reader is not at all surprised to find Plato using the imagery 
of hunger as a metaphor for ignorance here, given that earlier in the same dialogue he 
has Socrates describe the product peddled by a sophist as the ‘provisions upon which 
the soul is nourished’ (Protagoras 313c),50 going on to compare the sophist to a food 
merchant (Protagoras 313d). Second, Socrates expresses his criticism of Pericles at Gorgias 
516b-c when he says that Pericles, a supposed caretaker of man, showed his citizens ‘to 
                                                 
46 Compare this, for instance, to Xenophon’s stories of Socrates sending some of his 
companions to study with other people, such as Dionysodorus (Memorabilia 3.1.1-3).  For 
accounts of Plato’s Socrates also sending companions to study with others, see Laches 
180c-d and Theaetetus 151b. 
47 Emended translation. Cf. Alcibiades 118d-119a. 
48 See Apology 20a-b for another instance of Socrates using an agricultural metaphor to 
describe the educational needs of young people.  There too he alludes to cowherding 
when he asks Callias who would tend his two sons if they were ‘colts or calves.’ 
49 References to cowherding also appear at Minos 318a and Statesman 261d, 275a-276d.  
50 Patrick Coby, Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment: A Commentary on Plato’s 
Protagoras (Lewisburg, 1987), p. 52 has also noticed this connection. 
 18
be wilder than they were when he took them over.’  This language mirrors that of Ion 
540c where Plato has Socrates suggest that rhapsodes falsely believe that they know 
better than a cowherd what to ‘say to calm down his cattle when they’re going wild.’51  
While Socrates uses this agricultural hunger imagery as a tool to criticize 
Pericles, we might think of Socrates’ own relation to the feeding of cattle. We can see 
Socrates’ interaction with his companions symbolized by the cowherd who gathers up 
the stray, hungry cattle and guides them toward a pasture, where they feed themselves 
by grazing freely. This imagery is the ideal metaphor for teaching and learning in the 
mind of Socrates, given that he says in the Republic that future guardians should be 
protected from grazing ‘in a meadow of bad grass, where they crop and graze in many 
different places every day until, little by little, they unwittingly accumulate a large evil 
in their souls’ (Republic 401c) and that what philosophers should do once they’re old 
enough to retire from politics and military service is to ‘graze freely in the pastures of 
philosophy’ (Republic 498b).52 Meanwhile, in the Phaedrus, another dialogue in which 
Plato has Socrates emphasize the importance of feeding the soul with proper 
nourishment (Phaedrus 246e, 248b-c, 251b-c), Plato goes as far as to describe ‘the plain 
where truth stands’ as ‘this pasture (nome)’ that ‘has the grass (leimônos) that is the right 
food for the best part of the soul’ (248b-c).  All of these passages confirm that the 
philosopher sees the life of inquiry as something well characterized by agricultural 
hunger imagery.  Furthermore, seeing the similarity between Socrates and a cowherd 
resolves the apparent tension between Socrates’ denial in the Apology of being a teacher 
(19c-d, 33a-b) and his claim in the Gorgias to attempt the true politikê technê (521d-e).  
All of these agricultural hunger images call to mind a fuller version of what 
Vlastos begins to suggest when he distinguishes education ‘in the conventional sense, 
where to ‘teach’ is simply to transfer knowledge from a teacher’s to a learner’s mind’ 
from ‘engaging would-be learners in elenctic argument to make them aware of their 
own ignorance and enable them to discover for themselves the truth the teacher had 
held back.’53 If Socrates is correct in thinking that virtue cannot be fed to a student, then 
a moral teacher must aspire instead to be like a cowherd who attends to cattle such that 
they are not stray.  In order to flesh out what is meant by enabling students to discover 
truth for themselves, let me describe Socratic teaching and learning as consisting of the 
following.   
First, if the teacher is going to be able to put would-be learners in a position to 
chew on conceptual grass, s/he must know where the ideas worth chewing on (food for 
thought, so to speak) ‘grow,’ steering clear of the ‘bad grass’ of which Republic 401c 
warns. In this regard, even though Socrates claims not to have any knowledge of his 
own, he knows quite well what is at issue in inquiring into virtue, as is demonstrated by 
his aptitude for leading discussions. Next, the cowherd-teacher must know how to 
direct the students toward the pasture where the food for thought grows, that is, where 
ideas worth examining can be found in order to be chewed on. Socrates is especially 
                                                 
51 Paul Woodruff’s translation in Cooper, Complete Works.  
52 Thanks to Jeff Turner for pointing out this passage to me. 
53 Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cambridge, 1991), p. 32. One 
can agree with Vlastos that Socrates does hold something back from his interlocutors, 
even if questions remain about what, if anything, Socrates knows in the Platonic sense of 
knowledge. 
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gifted in this regard.  It has oft been noted that his personality has a special power to 
make others consider ideas that they would otherwise ignore.54  To use Kahn’s words, 
‘What looked to the world like Socrates’ flirtatious interest in handsome young men was 
in fact his way of focusing upon them the magnetic power of his own personality and 
thus drawing them to him ‘through the power of love.’’55  Once drawn in the students of 
such a cowherd-teacher have the chance to graze on the ideas growing in the pasture if 
they so choose.   
Socrates’ work as a cowherd-teacher is complete once he engages students in the 
conversations we observe in Plato’s dialogues. At that point he has put his interlocutors 
out to graze, that is, he has put them in a position to feed themselves. Hence, Socrates is 
a teacher, despite the fact that not every interlocutor responds ideally to his particular 
kind of pedagogy.  Once in the pasture students must choose to graze on the conceptual 
grass or not.  And, if they graze, they must decide for themselves which ideas to 
swallow. By this I mean to suggest that Socrates does not want anyone to believe 
anything uncritically, even though he does attempt to guide them. He questions his 
interlocutors in such a way that they must critically examine every idea at hand and 
decide for themselves whether or not to endorse them.  So, the student of the cowherd-
teacher is in the presence of ideas rather than being informed of them.  In the same 
fashion, Plato puts various ideas in the mouths of various characters in various settings, 
leaving the reader to decide what to think about these ideas, and in this way the 
dialogues put us in the presence of ideas rather than trying to report them to us.  It 
seems clear that Plato learned the pedagogical value of this approach to teaching from 
Socrates.  
Each day Socrates is an exemplar of the philosophical activity, which begins with 
wondering (Theaetetus 155d) about things that are puzzling. His version of education is a 
mutual exchange that allows him to inquiry alongside his interlocutors.  Thus, in 
Socratic education both ‘teacher’ and ‘student’ are learners with the opportunity to be 
improved by the experience of the dialogue.  Socrates chews on ideas with his 
interlocutors, unlike the cowherd, who does not eat alongside the cattle.  In this, finally 
we see the limit of the agricultural hunger imagery’s utility.  The cowherd is just an 
image of the philosophical teacher precisely because it does not capture every aspect of 
philosophical teaching.  
It should, however, be noted that being an exemplar of the life of earnest rational 
inquiry is not at all the same as encouraging other people to imitate Socrates 
specifically.56  Xenophon writes of his Socrates:  
He rescued many from these states by inspiring them with a 
desire for goodness and offering them hope that, if they took 
themselves in hand, they would become truly good.  At the same 
                                                 
54 See, e.g., Symposium 216b. 
55 Charles H. Kahn, ‘Aeschines on Socratic Eros’, in Socratic Movement, ed. Vander 
Waerdt, p. 94. 
56 Nehamas, ‘What Did Socrates Teach and to Whom Did He Teach It?’ Review of 
Metaphysics, 46 (1992), pp 279-306 agrees with me that Socrates is neither a teacher in the 
conventional sense nor in the sense of offering oneself as a model to be imitated.  
However, Nehamas does not explore what it means to be a teacher in the sense 
emphasized here of being a cowherd tending to grazing students. 
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time he never undertook to teach how this could be done; but by 
obviously being such a person, he made those who spent their 
time with him hope that, if they followed his example 
(mimounenous ekeinon), they would develop the same character.57  
 
Time after time Socrates puts interlocutors in a position to see for themselves that the 
good life is the life of inquiry, but surely he would want the imitators of whom 
Xenophon speaks to understand the difference between imitating him in particular and 
aspiring in general to the pursuit of knowledge. Socrates concedes that some young men 
do imitate him because they have taken pleasure in watching him question and refute 
other people (Apology 23c-d).  Nevertheless, Socrates, unlike the sophists, never 
encourages anyone to imitate him nor does he endorse imitation.58  
Socrates’ refusal to encourage uncomplicated imitation places an intentional 
obstacle in front of his interlocutors: they must manage themselves. He wants them to be 
self-directed because, in the words of Taylor, ‘a good human soul is a self-directed 
soul.’59  Those mentioned at Apology 23c-d, who may be imitating the wrong things 
about Socrates, are at least on the right track insofar as they are automatoi, following 
Socrates ‘of their own free will.’  As a result, Socrates can see in them at least the 
capacity for self-direction.  Despite this capacity, his interlocutors tend to find it difficult 
to see that the good life is the life of inquiry precisely because they must discover for 
themselves this notion that Socrates puts them in position to see.  On account of this 
difficulty, Socrates recognizes the utility of associating with those who have the proper 
disposition (Theaetetus 151b, Charmides 154e) for chewing on what he puts his friends out 
to graze on, namely, conversations about serious matters.60 
The ethical dimension of life is complex enough that there are numerous notions 
Socrates wants his interlocutors to consider. However, in the dialogues being considered 
                                                 
57 Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, trans. Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, 
(London, 1990), p. 73. 
58 I agree with Nehamas, ‘What Did Socrates Teach’, p. 284 that ‘we have no evidence for 
thinking that Plato’s Socrates set his life up as a model of what the good life is, even if 
Plato may have seen and presented him as the best human being of his time.’ David 
Corey, ‘How the Sophists Taught Virtue: Exhortation and Association’, History of 
Political Thought, 26 (2005), pp. 1-20 offers the contrasting view that Socrates endorses 
imitation in the same way that the sophists use the method of association. 
59 Taylor, ‘The End of the Euthyphro’, Phronesis, 27 (1982), p. 113.  
60 Corey, ‘The Case against Teaching Virtue for Pay: Socrates and the Sophists’, History of 
Political Thought, 23 (2002), pp. 201-3 takes Euthydemus 272a-b and 304b as evidence that 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are particularly guilty of not being discriminating (with 
the exception of being able to pay the requisite fee) about those with whom they 
associate, while he claims that Protagoras, for example, is different.  He writes, ‘For the 
fact is that the practice of charging a fee did not in any way prevent the sophists from 
also carefully selecting their students based on other criteria.  Indeed, it comes out in the 
Protagoras itself that Protagoras had a number of criteria, some of them used by Socrates 
as well—age, family, natural talent (as well as being able to pay the fee)’ (p. 201).  Pace 
Corey, I suspect that this apparent difference amounts again to the strategic difference 
between forthrightly frivolous sophists and slyly flattering sophists. 
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here Socrates is particularly interested in leading students to a critical examination of the 
value of sophistic education, at the same time as he holds back his actual opinion of it.  
For example, when faced with Hippocrates’ apprehension about whether Protagoras 
will accept him as a student, Socrates does not announce to Hippocrates his suspicion 
that what is doubtful is not that Protagoras will take him as a student but rather that 
there is value in being Protagoras’ student (Protagoras 310d-312c).  Instead, during both 
the conversation they have in the courtyard as well as the one Socrates has with 
Protagoras, Socrates puts Hippocrates in a position to evaluate for himself what 
Protagoras really offers his students. In addition to the ideas involved in their own 
conversations with Socrates, his friends can also graze on what is revealed by his 
conversations with the sophists in which he tests their claims about the education they 
offer.61  
Socrates goes as far as to announce his intention to assist students in inspecting 
the quality of a sophistic education when he says to Gorgias, ‘Perhaps there’s actually 
someone inside who wants to become your pupil.  I notice some, in fact a good many, 
and they may well be embarrassed to question you.  So, while you’re being questioned 
by me, consider yourself being questioned by them as well’ (Gorgias 455c).  This 
comment is intended as much for Gorgias’ prospective students as it is for Gorgias 
himself because Socrates is well aware that embarrassment is not what impedes these 
students from evaluating a sophist’s suitability as a moral teacher.  If embarrassment 
were the only obstacle in front of a student with the same sort of questions Socrates asks 
about sophistic education, then this problem could be handled relatively easily. In truth 
it is more likely that these budding learners are simply at a loss about what to ask a 
prospective teacher. Think, for example, of Chaerephon’s inability to question Gorgias 
effectively (Gorgias 447d-448c).   
Even once they observe Socrates questioning the sophists on their behalf, most 
interlocutors still do not understand what is being uncovered.  To return to the case of 
Hippocrates, Plato chooses not to portray Hippocrates as ever really seeing what 
Socrates has uncovered, namely, that Protagoras is a not a craftsman of moral education.  
This authorial decision calls attention to the limits of what a cowherd-teacher can 
accomplish. That the Protagoras concludes without any account of whether or not 
Hippocrates remains intent on being Protagoras’ student might symbolize that whether 
students are improved by the guidance of a cowherd-teacher depends entirely upon 
them, upon their own individual appetites for virtue.  
 
B. Moral Feeding: Feast or Famine? 
Sophists like Protagoras and Gorgias turn out to be rather conventional in their 
method of instruction because they aim to transfer knowledge directly to their students. 
For example, students were usually required to ‘read and memorise writings of the great 
poets, Homer, Hesiod, and others, chosen because of the moral wisdom which they 
contained.’62 That memorization of ‘written discussions of important matters’ was central 
                                                 
61 Blank, ‘Socratics versus Sophists’, p. 7, n27 notes as an example of this sort of testing 
that at Memorabilia 3.1.1-3 Xenophon’s Socrates sends one of his friends to study 
generalship with Dionysodorus and then questions him upon his return about what he 
has learned, only to send him back once again to Dionysodorus.  
62 Kerferd, Sophistic Movement, p. 37. 
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to the sophistic curriculum63 demonstrates that the sophists, unlike Socrates, appear 
confident that sight can be put into blind eyes.  Mastery of antilogic, the teaching 
(particularly associated with Protagoras) that for every issue two contradictory 
arguments can be offered, was one of the elements considered by sophists to be 
indispensable to a successful citizen. Other pedagogy included question and answer 
sessions and testing one’s ability to speak briefly, which was thought by many, 
including the author of the Dissoi Logoi, to be ‘the mark of a man who knows the truth 
about things.’64  In the words of Broadie, ‘In short, one would learn to master a range of 
formal devices… The sophists’ staple, then, was the study and teaching of 
communication-skills for exercise in various fairly well defined civic situations.’65  While 
much of this instruction could be directly transferred to students, some of it is fed to 
students by encouraging them to imitate their teachers.  In particular the sophists are 
famous for including as prominent aspects of the advanced curriculum exhortation (‘a 
speech that inspires its audience to live virtuously’)66 and association, which Kerferd 
describes as the ‘close attention of teacher with pupil, in a kind of living together.’67 
From Protagoras’ description of the education wherein ‘so much care and 
attention is paid to virtue’ (Protagoras 326e) we can infer that he champions the use of 
encouraging and admonishing statements to guide young children toward which 
actions are to be repeated. He says that the primary education of children consists of 
statements from their parents and tutors such as ‘this is just, that is unjust, this is noble, 
that is ugly, this is pious, that is impious, he should do this, he should not do that’ 
(Protagoras 325c).  Once students base their future behavioral decisions on which 
previous acts were encouraged, they are learning through mimesis, that is, they are 
imitating the guide provided by the instructor.  Plato even has Protagoras go so far as to 
say, ‘If [the young student] obeys willingly, fine; if not, they straighten him out with threats 
and blows as if he were a twisted, bent piece of wood’ (Protagoras 325d; emphasis added).  This 
image could hardly stand in starker contrast with that of a cowherd-teacher tending a 
student grazing freely in a pasture of conceptual grass. Protagoras goes on to compare 
the laws, which serve as our moral teachers later in life, to the ‘the practice of writing-
teachers, who sketch the letters faintly with a pen in workbooks for their beginning 
students and have them write the letters over the patterns they have drawn’ (Protagoras 
326d).68  
While mimetic learning is naturally useful in beginning any activity, it is 
nevertheless a form of being fed, and if the reliance on imitation persists, imitation will 
limit what one can learn and who one can be in the same way that feeding an animal 
                                                 
63 Ibid., p. 31. 
64 Ibid., p. 32. 
65 Broadie, ‘Sophists and Socrates’, p. 74. 
66 Corey, ‘How the Sophists Taught Virtue’, p. 5. 
67 Kerferd, Sophistic Movement, p. 30. 
68 Whether one takes the traditional view that grammai are horizontal lines, as Taylor, 
Plato Protagoras (Oxford, 1976), p. 97 does, or the alternative view put forth by J. Adam 
and A.M. Adam, Plato Protagoras (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 131-3 that grammai are lines to 
be traced, the guidance that the instructor provides remains dangerous. 
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hinders its inclination to feed itself by hunting.69 In order to build an intellectual 
resource that will always be available to the student (even when the guide is not 
present) the use of imitation must taper off as soon as possible.70  (Once again, this is 
precisely why Socrates would not want anyone to imitate him in particular; rather, he 
would prefer that someone recognize the life of inquiry as a type of life worthy of 
aspiration, of which he in particular just happens to be an exemplar.) Protagoras’ 
unqualified endorsement of mimesis demonstrates that he is not interested in 
determining the extent and limitation of anyone’s natural endowment.71  Instead, he 
walks through cities, collecting students from wealthy families who hunger for 
knowledge of how to organize and deliver their thoughts in a way that effectively 
convinces audiences because they unreflectively believe that a successful life follows 
from possession of this skill, from knowing how to imitate Protagoras. 
For the sophists, virtue is being able to speak well in public.  However, while 
having this skill may lead to ‘success’ in the law courts, ‘success’ in terms of fame, etc., 
Socrates certainly does not understand success this way.  In contrast, success, for 
Socrates, is living a life of inquiry and having a healthy (harmonious) soul.  What 
Protagoras and Gorgias teach may yield one kind of success, but it is unrelated (and 
maybe even runs counter) to the kind of success with which Socrates is concerned.  As a 
result, with respect to the conception of virtue grounded in materialistic success, the 
sophists are feeding their students both directly and through the encouragement of 
imitation.  Yet, with respect to the Socratic conception of virtue, the sophists are starving 
their students.  As we see most clearly in the Gorgias, the sophists have as their goal not 
the acquisition of knowledge of virtue but simply to create conviction in the souls of an 
audience and to teach students this art of persuasion.72  
                                                 
69 Imitation of good things is at times given positive recognition in the dialogues.  A 
central example of this is the importance of homoiôsis theôi for Plato (Theaetetus 176b1). 
70 The ideal pedagogical progression would be to begin to learn how to write a particular 
letter by tracing over it and then to write it from memory (without the pre-traced guide).  
However, the writing analogy will take us only so far.  We are not, after all, examining 
how students learn to write but how they learn to be virtuous.  
71 Another example of Protagoras’ mimetic instruction is his treatment of punishment as 
a way of inculcating virtue into the soul (Protagoras 324b).  His hope is that one’s self-
interest will lead to the imitation of those living a life that does not entail punishment.  
Here too this pedagogy of mimesis does not yield a broad moral resource. 
72 Segal, ‘Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 
66 (1962), p. 106 notes that (because Gorgias claims in the Helen that logoi are like a 
psychic drug) ‘a reciprocal relationship between the psychic and physical 
worlds…constitutes a basic and necessary assumption of Gorgianic rhetorical practice.’ 
In this regard, Gorgias joins Democritus in preceding Plato in thinking that there is 
something that we could, following Democritus, call psychic medicine (Democritus B31). 
While Plato’s use of the body-soul medical analogies is not limited to the Gorgias, if 
Gorgias and Democritus were already considering the psychic pharmakon before Plato 
had Socrates do so, then it is interesting that the Gorgias is the dialogue in which Plato 
chooses to have this analogy figure most prominently.  This choice brings into stark 
relief the contrast between Gorgias’ psychic prescriptions (that speakers should say 
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In his quest to teach his students how to make listeners believe what they hear, 
Gorgias feeds students examples of what people tend to believe (that is, what is likely 
rather than what is true).73 After displaying his own rhetorical powers he then 
encourages students to imitate his ability to make an epideixis. The central problem with 
this is that, while it may be a successful way of teaching persuasiveness, it does not teach 
students anything about virtue. Furthermore, we can conclude that Gorgias is not really 
interested in having his students learn about justice from his boasting about how oratory 
operates without providing knowledge for students but merely providing conviction 
(Gorgias 454e, 458e).  This proves that, even though flattering sophists appear to feed 
their students, because they themselves suffer from what Kahn calls ‘cognitive 
emptiness’ they are in actuality starving them.74   
 From Gorgias himself comes the most crucial example of how corrupt one is 
when one starves souls by merely appearing to feed them knowledge. He says: 
If an orator and a doctor came to any city anywhere you like and 
had to compete in speaking in the assembly or some other 
gathering over which one of them should be appointed doctor, the 
doctor wouldn’t make any showing at all, but the one who had 
the ability to speak would be appointed, if he so wished.  And if 
he were to compete with any other craftsman whatever, the orator 
more than anyone else would persuade them that they should 
appoint him, for there isn’t anything that the orator couldn’t speak 
more persuasively about to a gathering than could any other 
craftsman whatever.  That’s how great the accomplishment of this 
craft is, and the sort of accomplishment it is! (Gorgias 456b-c) 
 
Even though an orator is not an expert on a given subject, it appears to non-experts that 
he practices a technê.  Gorgias claims that the very reason oratory is the supreme power 
is because the ignorant masses can be deceived by rhetoric (Gorgias 459a-c).75  Socrates 
says, ‘Oratory doesn’t need to have any knowledge of the state of [other crafts’] subject 
matters; it only needs to have discovered some device to produce persuasion in order to 
make itself appear to those who don’t have knowledge that it knows more than those 
who actually do have it’ (Gorgias 459b-c).  And to this Gorgias asks: ‘Well, Socrates, 
aren’t things made very easy when you come off no worse than the craftsmen even 
though you haven’t learned any other craft but this one?’ (Gorgias 459c) As a teacher, the 
sophist never asks students to understand serious things sincerely or to care about 
learning for its own sake.  Instead, flattering sophists take pride in their knack for being 
persuasive and at times deceptive. 
                                                                                                                                                 
what is persuasive to their audiences) and Socrates’ pharmakon (that speakers should say 
what is true and therefore beneficial to their audiences).  
73 Cf. Phaedrus 260c, 272e-273b. 
74 Kahn, ‘Drama and Dialectic in Plato’s Gorgias’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 1 
(1983), p. 85.  
75 Cf. Agathon’s remark to Socrates that ‘if you’re intelligent, you find a few sensible 
men much more frightening than a senseless crowd’ (Symposium 194b; Alexander 
Nehamas and Paul Woodruff‘s translation in Cooper, Complete Works).   
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Even though Euthydemus and Dionysodorus claim to teach virtue ‘better than 
anyone else and more quickly’ (Euthydemus 273d), they share with Protagoras and 
Gorgias a reliance on the method that never asks students to take responsibility for their 
own education. Their students are fed the sort of words that they are to imitate.  Socrates 
tells the brothers that they should guard their style from being imitated by others 
(Euthydemus 303e-304b).  If Socrates really considers it fine to learn eristic, then he would 
not discourage Euthydemus and Dionysodorus from teaching it widely. Perhaps 
Socrates should not worry so much about the consequences of being a student of 
frivolous sophists because, unlike flattering sophists who appear to feed students 
something serious, frivolous sophists do not pose as conventional moral teachers. As 
Socrates says, ‘The two of them are unwilling to give us a serious demonstration…I 
really think some splendid thing in them will appear whenever they begin to be in 
earnest, so let us beg and exhort and pray them to make it known’ (Euthydemus 288b-c).  
If they have anything to feed students, it has gone unnoticed by Socrates. By never even 
discussing issues of substance they are starving their pupils.  While we may 
congratulate the frivolous sophists for at least not attempting to be deceptive about 
whether they love truth, their blatant lack of love for truth still makes them unsuitable 
educators.   
 
V. Conclusion 
Nehamas suggests that Socrates is not a teacher of virtue because (1) he lacks 
genuine knowledge of the good and the ability to convey that knowledge to students, (2) 
he never explicitly offers himself to others as an example of how to live,76 and (3) even 
Plato fails to depict Socrates having ‘a long-lasting beneficial effect on anyone with 
whom he came into contact.’77 Given what an elusive and complex thing knowledge is 
for Plato, it should be no surprise if even someone like Socrates lacks knowledge of the 
Good.  So, I agree with Nehamas that Socrates is not a teacher in the conventional sense 
of education; he is not a teacher who knows something and conveys that knowledge to a 
student in an explicit fashion. However, Socrates never set out to be a traditional 
teacher.  To demonstrate this is clearly one of the main objectives Plato had in writing 
the dialogues; another is to show what kind of teacher Socrates did endeavor to be.  
When Socrates professes his own ignorance (albeit to some degree ironically) he 
puts those who know him in a position to conclude that intellectual honesty is more 
important than one’s reputation. For instance, Socrates is not ashamed to admit that he 
does not know what virtue is, even though his interlocutors assume he would be 
embarrassed if other people knew this about him (Meno 71b-c).  Socrates’ example 
stands in stark contrast with that of someone like Gorgias, who prides himself on being 
honest that his work is the business of persuasion not virtue, but ultimately he is too 
ashamed to stand by that claim (Gorgias 459c-460a). In this regard Socrates exists as an 
exemplar of how to live a good life.  
Given that Socrates inspired Plato’s own pursuit of the life dedicated to inquiry, 
we are left to wonder why Plato does not portray Socrates in the dialogues as having a 
lasting beneficial effect on anyone.  Socrates himself admits in the Apology that many 
promising young Athenians have followed him around and engaged in refutational 
                                                 
76 Nehamas, ‘What Did Socrates Teach’, p. 284. 
77 Nehamas, Virtues of Authenticity: Essays on Plato and Socrates (Princeton, 1999), p. xviii. 
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question and answer sessions with him, but he does not mention how many of these 
young people turned out very badly. Noting people such as Charmides and Alcibiades 
III who failed to learn the Good from Socrates, Nehamas and others wonder who was 
improved by interacting with Socrates.78 That these young men appear unmoved by 
their association with him is supposed to imply that Socrates was not capable of 
improving others.  If that is true, then frankly these discussions are quite charitable.  
Socrates also had connections to other infamous characters:  Acumenus; Adeimantus of 
Scambonidae; Agariste III; Alcibiades of Phegous; Andocides IV; Axiochus; Charicles; 
Critias IV; Damon; Diognetus; Eryximachus; Eucrates; Meletus of Athens; and Phaedrus 
(to name just those implicated in the mutilation of the herms in 415).79 The Socrates of 
the Republic knows the dangers to which he exposed those young ‘pups’ (Republic 539a-
b)!  Nevertheless, as Socrates points out, not one of the men he is supposed to have 
corrupted has come forward at his trial to accuse him nor has any relative (Apology 33d-
34b).  Instead, a substantial group of his friends and their relatives has congregated at 
his trial to support Socrates. 
Meanwhile, there is evidence that more than a few of Socrates’ companions 
either turned out well or were moved in a positive direction by their association with 
Socrates.  Even Alcibiades, Socrates’ most notorious companion, progressed to a certain 
extent as a result of his experience with Socrates. Alcibiades acknowledges that Socrates’ 
words move him deeply (Symposium 215c-216a), and he has let himself pay enough 
attention to Socrates’ words and deeds to learn several things.  First, Alcibiades has 
come to understand that physical beauty is not the stuff of seducing Socrates (Symposium 
216d-219a), and in the final moment of sexual rejection Alcibiades even manages to 
grasp enough of Socrates’ way of thinking to feel genuine admiration for Socrates’ 
‘natural character, his moderation, and his fortitude’ (Symposium 219d).  Second, unlike 
most, if not all, of Socrates’ interlocutors, Alcibiades has paid enough attention to 
discern Socrates’ tendency to be ironic (Symposium 216e). Alcibiades also notes that, 
while Socrates’ arguments ‘at first… strike you as totally ridiculous’ (Symposium 221e), 
‘if you see them when they open up like the statues, if you go behind their surface, 
you’ll realize that no other arguments make any sense. They’re truly worthy of a god, 
bursting with figurines of virtue inside.  They’re of great—no, of the greatest—
importance for anyone who wants to become a truly good man’ (Symposium 222a; 
emphasis added).  In this transformation from thinking of Socrates’ arguments as silly to 
thinking that they are endlessly interesting and important, we see what Socrates sees in 
Alcibiades, namely, the vast potential that made Socrates fall in love with him. Yet, by 
Alcibiades’ own admission, Socrates is only able to affect him if he gives Socrates ‘half a 
chance’ (216a).  Alcibiades admits his stubbornness, saying ‘I refuse to listen to him; I 
stop my ears and tear myself away from him’ (216a-b).  Alcibiades’ choice not to give 
Socrates ‘half a chance’ reveals that he ultimately does not really want to become a ‘truly 
good man’.  Alcibiades’ moral failings are not evidence one way or another in the 
assessment of Socrates’ teaching; that Alcibiades does not ultimately live up to his 
potential is clearly the result of his own deliberate choice to tear himself away from 
Socrates sooner than he should have. 
                                                 
78 Nehamas, ‘What Did Socrates Teach’, pp. 279-306. 
79 Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics (Indianapolis, 
2002), p. 18. 
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In terms of those who were affected positively by the historical Socrates in an 
enduring way, of course there is Plato as well as Xenophon and Antisthenes II of Athens, 
whom Xenophon describes as valuing more than anything else ‘the wealth of soul he 
acquired from Socrates that makes him eschew material things’ (Xenophon’s Symposium 
4.34-44).80  Furthermore, there are several characters in the dialogues who show signs of 
philosophical promise in response to knowing Plato’s Socrates, namely, Apollodorus, 
who through his association with Socrates learned that he was ‘the most worthless man 
on earth’ (Symposium 173a) and left his business (though not his riches) to follow 
Socrates,81 Critias III (of the Timaeus, not to be confused with Critias IV), Crito, 
Ctesippus, and Theaetetus, to name a handful.  In spite of what we do know about the 
people connected to Socrates, which is substantial, we could not possibly have accounts 
of the entire personal life had by every friend, interlocutor, and by-stander of Socrates or 
of every reader of Socratic writings.  These people have all potentially been improved by 
Socrates’ cowherding.  
Furthermore, it is crucial to recall when judging Socrates’ friends that learning is 
a process.82  It is completely consistent with the character of Socratic education that the 
things in life that are most worth knowing will be the most difficult and time consuming 
to learn.  So, we should not be surprised that someone like Crito needs an entire lifetime 
to understand Socrates’ perspective. Socrates has always worked patiently with him, as 
a farmer does with the seeds he really cares for and is serious about (Phaedrus 276b).  On 
the other hand, we see what a brilliant start Theaetetus was off to so early in his life.  The 
Stranger recognizes what an ideal interlocutor he has in Theaetetus, and as a result, he 
allows Theaetetus to be the interpreter for the ‘friends of the forms’ (Sophist 248a).  We 
are left to imagine what Theaetetus could have become if he had not, after fighting 
bravely, died so young.83  Yet, even Theaetetus might not have thought of Socrates as his 
teacher. This is a probable consequence of Socrates’ use of the cowherding method of 
pedagogy.  
A student may not even realize that s/he has a teacher because students tend to 
define teachers as those who explicitly articulate what is to be learned. Socrates alludes 
to this himself when he says that there have been ‘many cases where people who did not 
realize this fact [i.e., that Socrates’ had served as a midwife in their deliveries] took all 
the credit to themselves and thought that I was no good.  They have then proceeded to 
leave me sooner than they should’ (Theaetetus 150e).  So too do many graze for a day 
with Socrates and then fail to choose the life of grazing freely in the pastures of 
philosophy.  By rejecting conventional pedagogy Socrates forces students to assume the 
responsibility for their own education.84  They must choose between teachers who are 
                                                 
80 Ibid., p. 36. 
81 Ibid., p. 39.  
82 This raises a number of questions about teaching and learning in today’s academic 
institutions.  Although these questions are interesting and extremely important, they 
must asked and addressed elsewhere. 
83 Nails, People of Plato, p. 277. 
84 I wish to express my gratitude to Jeff Turner, Roslyn Weiss, Richard Patterson, Tom 
Stanley, and an anonymous reviewer at Polis for their helpful comments on earlier 
versions of this paper.  
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‘utterly grotesque’ and those who are ‘serious…few and beyond price’ (Euthydemus 
307a). 
 
Coleen Zoller      Susquehanna University 
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